By: Ross G. Currie
On June 5, 2025, a unanimous Supreme Court decided in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services that a plaintiff asserting “reverse” employment discrimination does not need to meet a heightened standard to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII. In its ruling, the Supreme Court resolved a split among lower federal appellate courts and clarified that a majority-group plaintiff is not held to a different standard than a minority-group plaintiff in the first step of the McDonnell Douglas test applied to Title VII and other employment discrimination claims. The Court’s decision brings uniformity to the way “reverse” discrimination claims are analyzed across the country.
The Circuit Split Before Ames
The overwhelming majority of employment discrimination cases are based on circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence. The McDonnell Douglas test, established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), provides a framework for analyzing such discrimination cases at summary judgment. Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must make out a prima facie case for discrimination, usually by showing that they were qualified for the job, that they were subject to an adverse employment action, and that the circumstances of the adverse employment action imply that a protected characteristic (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin) motivated the employer’s action. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reason for its decision. Finally, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to provide evidence that the employer’s stated reason is pretextual, and that discrimination was in fact the employer’s motive.
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Ames, the D.C., Sixth, Seventh, Eight, and Tenth Circuits held that a “reverse” discrimination plaintiff—a member of a majority group alleging discrimination—must make an additional showing of “background circumstances” in the first step of the McDonnell Douglas test. In those circumstances, a plaintiff had to establish “background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.” Other circuits, however, rejected the “background circumstances” element for a prima facie case in “reverse” discrimination cases, and held majority plaintiffs to the same standard as minority plaintiffs at that step in the analysis.
The Decision in Ames
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the notion that a majority-group plaintiff bears a heightened burden in the first step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Justice Katanji Brown-Jackson, writing for the Court, wrote that Title VII’s prohibition against discriminating against “any individual” did not distinguish majority- and minority-group individuals, and that “Congress left no room for courts to impose special requirements on majority-group plaintiffs alone,” and that “the standard for proving disparate treatment under Title VII does not vary based on whether or not the plaintiff is a member of a majority group.”
Justice Jackson further noted that the “background circumstances” rule also violates precedent requiring courts “to avoid inflexible applications of McDonnell Douglas’s first prong.” Under Supreme Court precedent, the elements of a prima facie case are not “intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic,” and that “the prima facie proof required can therefore differ from case to case.” The Court held in Ames that the “background circumstances” rule applied in the Sixth and several other circuits violated these principles by “require[ing] majority-group plaintiffs (and only majority group plaintiffs) to produce certain types of evidence—such as statistical proof or information about the relevant decisionmaker’s protected traits—that would not otherwise be required to make out a prima facie case.”
The Court accordingly held that lower courts cannot apply a “background circumstances” requirement to majority-group plaintiffs at the first step of the McDonnell Douglas test.
Takeaways from Ames
In the circuits that applied a “background circumstances” rule, courts will no longer hold majority-group plaintiffs to a higher evidentiary standard at the prima facie stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. This holding may embolden majority-group plaintiffs in those circuits to bring “reverse” discrimination claims due to having a potentially easier time overcoming a motion for summary judgment.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Ames does not, however, mean that “background circumstances” are no longer relevant considerations in “reverse” discrimination cases. Even courts that did not have a “background circumstances” element to a “reverse” discrimination prima facie case contemplated that “background circumstances” might be considered at the final step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis—whether the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for its action is pretext for discrimination. The Supreme Court’s decision in Ames may simply result in courts uniformly considering “background circumstances” at the end of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, rather than the beginning.
The practical effects of Ames, however, may be less significant than the nature of the underlying claim itself and the political climate in which it was decided and the attention it has received. The EEOC under the Trump Administration is increasingly scrutinizing diversity, equity, and inclusion (commonly referred to as “DEI”) programs as a basis for “reverse” discrimination. In fact, current EEOC guidance is that “there is no such thing as ‘reverse’ discrimination; there is only discrimination.”
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Ames may be more technical than substantive in how “reverse” discrimination claims may proceed, the perception of the Court as having lowered the bar for such claims in the current environment is likely to encourage more claims in the near term by majority-group applicants and employees who experience adverse employment actions when a minority-group individual is hired, promoted, or retained.
StraightforWARD Legal Advice:
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, together with recent EEOC guidance about potential DEI-based discrimination, raises the likelihood of an uptick in “reverse” discrimination claims under Title VII in the near future. Employers should regularly review their hiring, promotion, and termination policies and practices to ensure compliance with anti-discrimination laws, and be prepared for increased scrutiny of DEI programs by the EEOC and courts.
If you have questions regarding how this ruling might affect your organization or need assistance with employment discrimination concerns, please contact attorney Ross G. Currie at 215.647.6604 or rcurrie@thewardlaw.com for guidance and support.